Negotiations, a model of concurrency with multi party negotiation as primitive, have been recently introduced in [5, 6] . We initiate the study of games for this model. We study coalition problems: can a given coalition of agents force that a negotiation terminates (resp. block the negotiation so that it goes on forever)?; can the coalition force a given outcome of the negotiation? We show that for arbitrary negotiations the problems are EXPTIME-complete. Then we show that for sound and deterministic or even weakly deterministic negotiations the problems can be solved in PTIME. Notice that the input of the problems is a negotiation, which can be exponentially more compact than its state space.
Introduction
In [5, 6] , the first author and Jörg Desel have introduced a model of concurrency with multi party negotiation as primitive. The model allows one to describe distributed negotiations obtained by combining "atomic" multi party negotiations, or atoms. Each atom has a number of parties (the subset of agents involved), and a set of possible outcomes. The parties agree on an outcome, which determines for each party the subset of atoms it is ready to engage in next.
Ill-designed negotiations may deadlock, or may contains useless atoms, i.e., atoms that can never be executed. The problem whether a negotiation is well designed or sound was studied in [5, 6] . The main result was the identification of two classes, called deterministic and acyclic weakly deterministic negotiations, for which the soundness problem is tractable: while the problem is PSPACE-complete for arbitrary negotiations, it becomes polynomial for these two classes.
In this paper we start the study of games on negotiations. As for games played on pushdown automata [12] , vector addition systems with states (VASS) [3] , counter machines [9] , or asynchronous automata [10] , games on negotiations can be translated into games played on the (reachable part of the) state space. However, the number of states of a negotiation may grow exponentially in the number of agents, and so the state space can be exponentially larger than the negotiation. We explore the complexity of solving games in the size of the negotiation, not on the size of the state space. In particular, we are interested in finding negotiation classes for which the winner can be decided in polynomial time, thus solving the state space explosion problem.
We study games formalizing the two most interesting questions related to a negotiation. First, can a given coalition (i.e., a given subset of agents) force termination of the negotiation? (Negotiations may contain cycles.) Second, can the coalition force a given final outcome?
Our first results show that these two problems are EXPTIME-complete in the size of the negotiation. This is the case even if the negotiation is deterministic, and so it seems as if the tractability results of [5, 6] cannot be extended to games. But then, we are able to show that, very surprisingly, the problems are polynomial for deterministic (or even weakly deterministic) negotiations that are sound. This is very (Distributed) Negotiations. A distributed negotiation is a set of atoms together with a transition function X that assigns to every triple (n, a, r) consisting of an atom n, a party a of n, and an outcome r of n a set X (n, a, r) of atoms. Intuitively, this is the set of atomic negotiations agent a is ready to engage in after the atom n, if the outcome of n is r.
Formally, given a finite set of atoms N, let T (N) denote the set of triples (n, a, r) such that n ∈ N, a ∈ P n , and r ∈ R n . A negotiation is a tuple N = (N, n 0 , n f , X ), where n 0 , n f ∈ N are the initial and final atoms, and X : T (N) → 2 N is the transition function. Further, N satisfies the following properties: (1) every agent of A participates in both n 0 and n f ; (2) for every (n, a, r) ∈ T (N): X (n, a, r) = / 0 iff n = n f . Graphical representation. Negotiations are graphically represented as shown in Figure 1 . For each atom n ∈ N we draw a black bar; for each party a of P n we draw a white circle on the bar, called a port. For each (n, a, r) ∈ T (N), we draw a hyper-arc leading from the port of a in n to all the ports of a in the atoms of X (n, a, r), and label it by r. Figure 1 shows two Father-Daughter-Mother negotiations. On the left, Daughter and Father negotiate with possible outcomes yes (y), no (n), and ask mother (am). If the outcome is the latter, then Daughter and Mother negotiate with outcomes yes, no. In the negotiation on the right, Father, Daughter and Mother negotiate with outcomes yes and no. If the outcome is yes, then Father and Daughter negotiate a return time (atom n 1 ) and propose it to Mother (atom n 2 ). If Mother approves (outcome yes), then the negotiation terminates, otherwise (outcome r) Daughter and Father renegotiate the return time.
Semantics.
A marking of a negotiation N = (N, n 0 , n f , X ) is a mapping x : A → 2 N . Intuitively, x(a) is the set of atoms that agent a is currently ready to engage in next. The initial and final markings, denoted by x 0 and x f respectively, are given by x 0 (a) = {n 0 } and x f (a) = / 0 for every a ∈ A. A marking x enables an atom n if n ∈ x(a) for every a ∈ P n , i.e., if every party of n is currently ready to engage in it. If x enables n, then n can take place and its parties agree on an outcome r; we say that (n, r) occurs. Abusing language, we will call this pair also an outcome. The occurrence of (n, r) produces a next marking x ′ given by x ′ (a) = X (n, a, r) for every a ∈ P n , and x ′ (a) = x(a) for every a ∈ A \ P n . We write x (n,r) −−→ x ′ to denote this. By this definition, x(a) is always either {n 0 } or equals X (n, a, r) for some atom n and outcome r.
The marking x f can only be reached by the occurrence of (n f , r) (r being a possible outcome of n f ), and it does not enable any atom. Any other marking that does not enable any atom is a deadlock.
Reachable markings are graphically represented by placing tokens (black dots) on the forking points of the hyper-arcs (or in the middle of an arc). Figure 1 shows on the right a marking in which F and D are ready to engaging n 1 and M is ready to engage in n 2 .
We write x 1 σ − → to denote that there is a sequence
such that σ = (n 1 , r 1 ) . . . (n k , r k ) . . .. If x 1 σ − →, then σ is an occurrence sequence from the marking x 1 , and x 1 enables σ . If σ is finite, then we write x 1 σ − → x k+1 and say that x k+1 is reachable from x 1 .
Soundness.
A negotiation is sound if (a) every atom is enabled at some reachable marking, and (b) every occurrence sequence from the initial marking either leads to the final marking x f , or can be extended to an occurrence sequence that leads to x f .
The negotiations of Figure 1 are sound. However, if we set in the left negotiation X (n 0 , M, st) = {n 2 } instead of X (n 0 , M, st) = {n 2 , n f }, then the occurrence sequence (n 0 , st)(n 1 , yes) leads to a deadlock. Determinism and weak determinism. An agent a ∈ A is deterministic if for every (n, a, r) ∈ T (N) such that n = n f there exists an atom n ′ such that X (n, a, r) = {n ′ }.
The negotiation N is weakly deterministic if for every (n, a, r) ∈ T (N) there is a deterministic agent b that is a party of every atom in X (n, a, r), i.e., b ∈ P n ′ for every n ′ ∈ X (n, a, r). In particular, every reachable atom has a deterministic party. It is deterministic if all its agents are deterministic.
Graphically, an agent a is deterministic if no proper hyper-arc leaves any port of a, and a negotiation is deterministic if there are no proper hyper-arcs. The negotiation on the left of Figure 1 is not deterministic (it contains a proper hyper-arc for Mother), while the one on the right is deterministic.
Games on Negotiations
We study a setting that includes, as a special case, the questions about coalitions mentioned in the introduction: Can a given coalition (subset of agents) force termination of the negotiation? Can the coalition force a given concluding outcome?
In many negotiations, there are reachable markings that enable more than one atom. If two of those atoms share an agent, the occurrence of one might disable the other and they are not truly concurrent. For a game where we want to allow concurrent moves, we formalize this concept with the notion of an independent set of atoms.
Definition 3.1.
A set of atoms S is independent if no two distinct atoms of S share an agent, i.e., P n ∩ P n ′ = / 0 for every n, n ′ ∈ S, n = n ′ .
It follows immediately from the semantics that if a marking x enables all atoms of S and we fix an outcome r i for each n i ∈ S, then there is a unique marking x ′ such that x σ − → x ′ for every sequence σ = (n 1 , r 1 ) . . . (n k , r k ) such that each atom of S appears exactly once in σ . In other words, x ′ depends only on the outcomes of the atoms, and not on the order in which they occur.
A negotiation arena is a negotiation whose set N of atoms is partitioned into two sets N 1 and N 2 . We consider concurrent games [2, 1] with three players called Player 1, Player 2, and Scheduler. At each step, Scheduler chooses a nonempty set of independent atoms among the atoms enabled at the current marking of the negotiation arena. Then, Player 1 and Player 2, independently of each other, select an outcome for each atom in S ∩ N 1 and S ∩ N 2 , respectively. Finally, these outcomes occur in any order, and the game moves to the unique marking x ′ mentioned above. The game terminates if it reaches a marking enabling no atoms, otherwise it continues forever.
Formally, a partial play is a sequence of tuples (S i , F i,1 , F i,2 ) where each S i ⊆ N is a set of independent atoms and F i, j assigns to every n ∈ S i ∩ N j an outcome r ∈ R n . Furthermore it must hold that every atom n ∈ S i is enabled after all atoms in S 0 , ..., S i−1 have occurred with the outcomes specified by F 0,1 , F 0,2 , ..., F i−1,1 , F i−1,2 . A play is a partial play that is either infinite or reaches a marking enabling no atoms. For a play π we denote by π i the partial play consisting of the first i tuples of π.
We consider two different winning conditions. In the termination game, Player 1 wins a play if the play ends with n f occurring, otherwise Player 2 wins. In the concluding-outcome game, we select for each agent a a set of outcomes G a such that n f ∈ X (n, a, r) for r ∈ G a (that is, after any outcome r ∈ G a , agent a is ready to terminate). Player 1 wins if the the play ends with n f occurring, and for each agent a the last outcome (n, r) of the play such that a is a party of n belongs to G a .
A strategy σ for Player j, j ∈ {1, 2} is a partial function that, given a partial play π = (S 0 , F 0,1 , F 0,2 ), ..,
) and a set of atoms S i+1 returns a function F i+1, j according to the constraints above. A play π is said to be played according to a strategy σ of Player j if for all i, σ (π i , S i+1 ) = F i+1, j . A strategy σ is a winning strategy for Player j if he wins every play that is played according to σ . Player j is said to win the game if he has a winning strategy. Notice that if Player 1 has a winning strategy then he wins every play against any pair of strategies for Player 2 and Scheduler. Definition 3.2. Let N be a negotiation arena. The termination (resp. concluding-outcome) problem for N consists of deciding whether Player 1 has a winning strategy for the termination game (concludingoutcome game). Assume we want to model the following situation: In a family with Father (F), Mother (M) and two Daughters (D 1 and D 2 ), Daughter D 1 wants to go to a party. She can talk to each parent individually, but can choose beforehand whether to take her sister D 2 with her or not. Figure 2 models this negotiation. The solid edges for the daughters between n 2 and n 3 and between n 4 and n 5 "ask the other parent" outcomes, while the dashed edges represent the "yes" and "no" outcomes. Assume the daughters work together to reach termination. Then in N 1 = {n 1 , n 2 , n 3 } the daughters have a majority which we will interpret as "they can choose which outcome is taken". Can the daughters force termination?
At atom n 1 the daughters decide whether D 2 should participate in the conversation with the parents (outcome t) or not (outcome s). If the daughters choose outcome s, then Father and Mother can force an infinite loop between n 4 and n 5 . On the contrary, if the daughters choose to stay together, then, since they control atom n 2 , they can force a "yes" or "no" outcome, and therefore termination.
The questions whether a coalition C of agents can force termination or a certain outcome are special instances of the termination and concluding-outcome problems. In these instances, an atom n belongs to N 1 -the set of atoms controlled by Player 1-iff a strict majority of the agents of n are members of C .
Coalitions
Before we turn to the termination and concluding-outcome problems, we briefly study coalitions. Intuitively, a coalition controls all the atoms where it has strict majority. We show that while the definition of the partition of the atoms N according to the participating agents may seem restricting, this is not the case: In all cases but the deterministic sound case, any partition can be reached, possibly by adding agents.
We define the partition of N via a partition of the agents: Let the agents A be partitioned into two sets A 1 and A 2 . Define N 1 = {n ∈ N : |P n ∩ A 1 | > |P n ∩ A 2 |}, N 2 = N\N 1 . Note that ties are controlled by A 2 .
We first show that in the nondeterministic and weakly deterministic case, this definition is equivalent to one where we decide control for each atom and not for each agent. Figure 3 : Atom control via additional agents
Consider the example given in Figure 3 . On the left a deterministic negotiation with two agents is given. Assume the coalitions are A 1 = {A} and A 2 = {B}. By the definition above, N 2 = N, thus coalition A 2 controls every atom. We want to change control of n 1 so that A 1 controls n 1 , changing the negotiation to a weakly deterministic one on the way. We add an additional agent a that participates in n 0 , n 1 , n f as shown in Figure 3 in the middle and set A 1 = {A, a}. Now A 1 controls n 1 but also n 0 and n f . We therefore add another agent b that participates in n 0 , n f as shown in Figure 3 on the right. Now the partition of atoms is exactly N 1 = {n 1 } and N 2 = {n 0 , n 2 , n f }, as desired. In general, by adding nondeterministic agents to the negotiation, we can change the control for each atom individually. For each atom n whose control we wish to change, we add a number of agents to that atom, the initial atom n 0 and final atom n f . We add nondeterministic edges for these agent from n 0 to {n, n f } for each outcome of n 0 and from n to {n, n f } for each outcome of n. It may be necessary to add more agents to n 0 that move to n f in order to preserve the control of n 0 or n f . This procedure changes the control of n while preserving soundness and weak determinism.
We proceed by showing that in the deterministic case, we cannot generate any atom control by adding more agents. Lemma 3.3. We cannot add deterministic agents to the negotiation on the loft of Figure 3 in a manner, such that soundness is preserved and Player 1 controls n 1 , Player 2 controls n 2 .
Proof. Consider again the deterministic negotiation game on the left of Figure 3 . Assume we have added deterministic agents such that Player 1 controls n 1 . After the occurring sequence x 0 (n 0 ,a) − −− → x 1 (n 1 ,a) − −− → x 2 , those additional agents have moved deterministically, either to n 1 or n f . 1 If any agent remains in n 1 , choosing outcome b in n 2 leads to a deadlock, otherwise, choosing a leads to a deadlock. Thus the negotiation is no longer sound.
The Termination Problem
We turn to the general complexity of the problem. It is easy to see that the termination problem can be solved in exponential time.
Theorem 4.1. The termination problem is in EXPTIME.
Proof. Sketch. (See the appendix for details.) We construct a concurrent reachability game on a graph such that Player 1 wins the negotiation game iff she wins this new game. The game has single exponential size in the size of the negotiation arena.
The nodes of the graph are either markings x of the negotiation, or pairs (x, N x ), where x is a marking and N x is an independent set of atoms enabled at x. Nodes x belong to Scheduler, who chooses a set N x , after which the play moves to (x, N x ). At nodes (x, N x ) Players 1 and 2 concurrently select outcomes for their atoms in N x , and depending on their choice the play moves to a new marking. Player 1 wins if the play reaches the final marking x f . Since the winner of a concurrent game with reachability objectives played on a graph can be determined in polynomial time (see e.g. [2] ), the result follows.
Unfortunately, there is a matching lower bound.
Theorem 4.2. The termination problem is EXPTIME-hard even for negotiations in which every reachable marking enables at most one atom.
Proof. Sketch. (See the appendix for details.) The proof is by reduction from the acceptance problem for alternating, linearly-bounded Turing machines (TM) [4] . Let M be such a TM with transition relation δ , and let x be an input of length n.
We define a negotiation with an agent I modeling the internal state of M, an agent P modeling the position of the head, and one agent C i for each 1 ≤ i ≤ n modeling the i-th cell of the tape. The set of atoms contains one atom n q,α,k for each triple (q, α, k), where q is a state of M, k is the current position of the head, and α is the current symbol in the k-th tape cell.
The parties of the atom n q,α,k are I, P and C k , in particular, I and P are agents of all atoms. The atom n q,α,k has one outcome r τ for each element τ ∈ δ (q, α), where τ is a triple consisting of a new state, a new tape symbol, and a direction for the head. We informally define the function X (n q,α,k ,C k , r τ ) by means of an example. Assume that, for instance, τ = (q ′ , β , R), i.e., at control state q and with the head reading α, the machine can go to control state q ′ , write β , and move the head to the right. Then we have: (i) X (n q,α,k , I, r τ ) contains all atoms of the form n q ′ , , (where stands for a wildcard); (ii) X (n q,α,k , P, r) contains the atoms n , ,k+1 ; and (iii) X (n q,α,k ,C k , r τ ) contains all atoms n ,β , . If atom n q,α,k is the only one enabled and the outcome r τ occurs, then clearly in the new marking the only atom enabled is n q ′ ,β ,k+1 . So every reachable marking enables at most one atom.
Finally, the negotiation also has an initial atom that, loosely speaking, takes care of modeling the initial configuration.
The partition of the atoms is: an atom n q,α,k belongs to N 1 if q is an existential state of M, and to N 2 if it is universal. It is easy to see that M accepts x iff Player 1 has a winning strategy.
Notice that if no reachable marking enables two or more atoms, Scheduler never has any choice. Therefore, the termination problem is EXPTIME-hard even if the strategy for Scheduler is fixed.
A look at points (i)-(iii) in the proof sketch of this theorem shows that the negotiations obtained by the reduction are highly nondeterministic. In principle we could expect a lower complexity in the deterministic case. However, this is not the case.
Theorem 4.3. The termination problem is EXPTIME-hard even for deterministic negotiations in which every reachable marking enables at most one atom.
Proof. Sketch. (See the appendix for details.) We modify the construction of Theorem 4.2 so that it yields a deterministic negotiation. The old construction has an atom n q,α,k for each state q, tape symbol α, and cell index k, with I, P, and C k as parties.
The new construction adds atoms n q,k , with I and P as parties, and n α,k , with P and C k as parties. Atoms n q,k have an outcome for each tape symbol α, and atoms n α,k have an outcome for each state q. New atoms are controlled by Player 1.
In the new construction, after the outcome of n q,α,k for transition (q ′ , β , R) ∈ δ (q, α), agent C k moves to n β ,k , and agents I and P move to n q ′ ,k+1 . Intuitively, C k waits for the head to return to cell k, while agents I and P proceed. Atom n q ′ ,k+1 has an outcome for every tape symbol γ. Intuitively, at this atom Player 1 guesses the current tape symbol in cell k + 1; the winning strategy corresponds to guessing right. After guessing, say, symbol γ, agent I moves directly to n q ′ ,γ,k+1 , while P moves to n γ,k+1 . Atom n γ,k+1 has one outcome for every state of M. Intuitively, Player 1 now guesses the current control state q ′ , after which both P and C k+1 move to n q ′ ,γ,k+1 . Notice that all moves are now deterministic.
If Player 1 follows the winning strategy, then the plays mimic those of the old construction: a step like (n q,α,k , (q ′ , β , R)) in the old construction, played when the current symbol in cell k + 1 is γ, is mimicked by a sequence (n q,α,k , (q ′ , β , R)) (n q ′ ,k+1 , γ) (n γ,k+1 , q ′ ) of moves in the new construction.
Termination in Sound Deterministic Negotiations
In [5, 6] it was shown that the soundness problem (deciding whether a negotiation is sound) can be solved in polynomial time for deterministic negotiations and acyclic, weakly deterministic negotiations (the case of cyclic weakly deterministic negotiations is open), while the problem is PSPACE-complete for arbitrary negotiations. Apparently, Theorem 4.3 proves that the tractability of deterministic negotiations stops at game problems. We show that this is not the case. Well-designed negotiations are sound, since otherwise they contain atoms that can never occur (and can therefore be removed), or a deadlock is reachable. Therefore, we are only interested in the termination problem for sound negotiations. We prove that for sound deterministic negotiations (in fact, even for the larger class of weakly deterministic type 2 negotiations) the termination and concluding-outcome problems are solvable in polynomial time. For this, we show that the well-known attractor construction for reachability games played on graphs as arenas can be "lifted" to sound and weakly deterministic type 2 negotiation arenas. Definition 5.1. Let N be a negotiation arena with a set of atoms N = N 1 ∪ N 2 . Given n ∈ N, let P n,det be the set of deterministic agents participating in n.
The attractor of the final atom n f is
∃r ∈ R n ∀a ∈ P n,det : X (n, a, r) ∈ A k } ∪ {n ∈ N 2 : ∀r ∈ R n ∀a ∈ P n,det : X (n, a, r) ∈ A k } Given a marking x = x f of N and a deterministic agent a, the attractor position of a at x is the smallest k such that x(a) ∈ A k , or ∞ if x(a) / ∈ A . Let a 1 , . . . , a k be the deterministic agents of N . The (attractor) position vector of x is the tuple (p 1 , ..., p k ) where p i is the attractor position of a i . Theorem 5.2. Let N be a sound, weakly deterministic type 2 negotiation arena. Player 1 has a winning strategy in the termination game iff n 0 ∈ A . Proof. We start with an observation: If all deterministic agents are ready to take part in n f , then n f and only n f is enabled. Indeed, since deterministic agents are only ready to engage in at most one atom, the only atom with a deterministic party that can be enabled is n f . Moreover, by weak determinism type 2 every atom has a deterministic party, and so no atom other than n f can be enabled. Finally, by soundness at least one atom is enabled, and so n f is the only enabled atom. (⇐): Assume that n 0 ∈ A . We fix the attractor strategy for Player 1. We define the attractor index of an atom n ∈ A as the smallest k such that n ∈ A k . The strategy for an atom n ∈ N 1 ∩ A is to choose any outcome such that all deterministic parties of n move to an atom of smaller attractor index; formally, we choose any outcome r such that for every deterministic party a the singular atom in X (n, a, r) has smaller attractor index than n. Such an outcome exists by construction of A . For atoms n ∈ N 1 \ A we choose an arbitrary atom. Notice that this strategy is not only memoryless, but also independent of the current marking.
We show that the attractor strategy is winning. By the definition of the game, we have to prove that every play following the strategy ends with n f occurring. By the observation above, it suffices to prove that the play reaches a marking at which every deterministic agent is ready to engage in n f .
Assume there is a play π where Player 1 plays according to the attractor strategy, which never reaches such a marking. Then the play never reaches the final marking x f either. We claim that at all markings reached along π, the deterministic agents are only ready to engage in atoms of A . We first observe that, initially, all deterministic agents are ready to engage in n 0 , and n 0 ∈ A . Now, assume that in some marking reached along π the deterministic agents are only ready to engage in atoms of A . Then, by weak determinism type 2, all enabled atoms belong to A , and therefore also the atoms chosen by Scheduler. By the definition of A , after an atom of N 2 ∩ A occurs, the deterministic agents are ready to engage in atoms of A only; by the definition of the attractor strategy, the same holds for atoms of N 1 ∩ A . This concludes the proof of the claim.
Since all markings x reached along π satisfy x = x f and x(a) ∈ A for every deterministic agent a, they all have an associated attractor position vector whose components are natural numbers. Let P k denote the position vector of the marking reached after k ≥ 0 steps in π. Initially only the initial atom n 0 is enabled, and so P 0 = (k 0 , k 0 , . . . , k 0 ), where k 0 is the attractor position of n 0 . We have k 0 < |N|, the number of atoms of the negotiation arena N . Given two position vectors P = (p 1 , ..., p k ) and P ′ = (p ′ 1 , ..., p ′ k ), we say P ≺ P ′ if p i ≤ p ′ i for every 1 ≤ i ≤ k, and p i < p ′ i for at least one 1 ≤ i ≤ k. By the definition of the attractor strategy, the sequence P 0 , P 1 , ... of attractor positions satisfies P i+1 ≺ P i for every i. Since ≺ is a well-founded order, the sequence is finite, i.e., the game terminates. By the definition of the game, it terminates at a marking that does not enable any atom. Since, by assumption, the play never reaches the final marking x f , this marking is a deadlock, which contradicts the soundness of N . (⇒): As this part is dual to part ⇐, we only sketch the idea. The complete proof can be found in the appendix.
Let B = N \ A , and assume n 0 ∈ B. A winning strategy for Player 2 is to choose for an atom n ∈ N 2 ∩ B any outcome r such that at least one deterministic agent moves to an atom not in A . Such an outcome exists by construction of A . For atoms in N 2 \ B we chose an arbitrary outcome.
This strategy achieves the following invariant: If at some marking x reached along a play according to this strategy, there is a deterministic agent a that satisfies x(a) = n and n ∈ B, then the same holds after one more step of the play. We then conclude that since n 0 ∈ B this invariant holds in every step of the play. Therefore n f , in which all deterministic agents participate and which is not in B, can never be enabled. Finally, because of soundness a play cannot end in a deadlock and thus every play will be of infinite length. We still have to consider the possibility that requiring soundness alone, without the addition of weak determinism type 2, already reduces the complexity of the termination problem. The following theorem shows that this is not the case, and concludes our study. The proof is again an adaption of the reduction from turing machines and can be found in the appendix.
Theorem 5.4. The termination problem is EXPTIME-hard for sound negotiation arenas.
The Concluding-Outcome Problem
We demonstrate that the algorithm can also be used to solve the concluding-outcome problem. Remember that for each agent a we have selected a set G a of outcomes that lead to the final atom and that we want occur. The key idea is to modify the negotiation in the following way: We add two atoms per agent, say good a and bad a , and redirect the outcomes of that agent that lead to the final atom to good a if they are in G a and to bad a otherwise. We illustrate this approach by example.
We slightly change the setting of Father, Mother and two Daughters such that both daughters want to go to the party. In the negotiation, that results in two additional atoms where D 2 talks alone with each parent. Figure 4 shows the new negotiation omitting all edges of father and mother to simplify the representation. They both have a nondeterministic edge from each of their ports leading to all of their respective ports.
Imagine the goal of Daughter D 1 is to get a "yes" answer for herself, but a 'no" answer for D 2 , who always spoils the fun. Will a coalition with one parent suffice to achieve the goal? To answer this question, we modify the negotiation before applying the construction as shown in Figure 4 . We introduce dummy atoms good i and bad i for each Daughter i, and we redirect "yes" transitions leading to n f to good 1 and bad 2 (these transitions are represented as dashed lines), analogously we redirect "no" transitions to bad 1 and good 2 (represented as dotted lines).
We apply the algorithm with a slight alteration: Instead of starting from n f , we initially add all newly introduced good atoms to the attractor. Applying the algorithm for the coalition Father-D 1 yields {good 1 ,bad 2 ,n 4 } as attractor; for Mother-D 1 we get {good 1 ,bad 2 ,n 5 }. So neither parent has enough influence to achieve the desired outcome. 
Conclusions and Related Work
We have started the study of games in the negotiation model introduced in [5, 6] . Our results confirm the low computational complexity of deterministic negotiations, however with an important twist: while even the simplest games are EXPTIME-hard for arbitrary deterministic negotiations, they become polynomial in the sound case. So soundness, a necessary feature of a well designed negotiation, also turns out to have a drastic beneficial effect on the complexity of the games. We have shown that our games are also polynomial for sound and weakly deterministic negotiations. However, the complexity of deciding soundness for this case is unknown. We conjecture that it is also polynomial, as for the deterministic case.
The objectives we have considered so far are qualitative: Either a coalition can reach termination or not, either it can enforce a concluding outcome or not. A possibility for future studies would be to look at quantitative objectives.
